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Studies & Analyses No. 298 – Economic Integration of Eurasia: Opportunities and Challenges of Global Significance Abstract
With the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991, a new frontier in the process of globalization of the
world economy opened up: the economic integration of the Eurasian "super-continent". This paper begins
to explore the process and prospects of economic integration of the huge land-mass that stretches from
the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  Oceans  and  from  the  Arctic  Sea  to  the  Indian  Ocean.  Since  the  Eurasian
economic integration process is of global significance, there are also geo-political aspects and implications
to be considered. This paper touches on some of these at the end, but focuses principally on exploring the
economic  dimensions  and  significance  of  the  integration  process  of  Eurasia.  It  compiles  evidence  on
Eurasian  integration  in  the  areas  of  energy  and  non-energy  trade  and  transport,  illicit  drug  trade,
investment  and  capital  flows,  migration,  and  communication  and  knowledge.  It  concludes  with  a
consideration of the institutional and political dimensions that affect regional cooperation for Eurasia and
with some broad policy recommendations. The paper represents only a first step in what is necessarily a
major research undertaking. But the authors hope that it will provoke thought, debate and follow-up
research.
5
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* The authors are respectively Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution and MBA and MPA/ID candidate at Harvard University. They
gratefully acknowledge the comments of participants in a seminar at the World Bank and especially of Peter Thomson and Jakob von
Weiszaecker where some early research findings were presented.With the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991, a new frontier in the process of globalization of the
world economy opened up: the economic integration of the Eurasian “super-continent”. This paper begins
to explore the process and prospects of economic integration of the huge land-mass that stretches from
the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans and from the Arctic Sea to the Indian Ocean
1. Since the Eurasian
economic integration process is of global significance, there are also geo-political aspects and implications
that need to be considered. This paper touches on some of these at the end, but focuses principally on
exploring the economic dimensions and significance of the integration process of Eurasia. It represents only
a first step in what is necessarily a major research undertaking. But it hopes to provoke thought, debate
and follow-up research.
The Eurasian continental space was actually integrated for centuries, if not millennia, before the arrival
of modern times. Anthropologists speculate that much of modern humanity originated in and spread from
the Mongolian steppes millions of years ago. These very early sweeps were followed from the East more
recently by waves of conquerors, among them coming from the East Genghis Khan and Attila the Hun, and
from the West Alexander the Great and later out of the Arab Peninsula various Islamic leaders
2. The Great
Silk Road (represented in a stylized manner in Figure 1
3) in many ways serves as the epitome of Eurasian
economic and cultural connectedness, as it spread East-West from the Chinese Sea through Central Asia
to the Mediterranean Sea and on to Western Europe, with North-South branches veering off along the
way,  connecting  also  the  Indian  Subcontinent  and  the  northern  reaches  of  what  is  Russia  today
4.
Commerce, culture and religion spread along this route, as did conflict and disease, including the Black
Death of the plague in the mid-14th Century
5.
[Figure 1]
Many factors contributed to the eventual disintegration of the Eurasian economic space and in particular
the decline in the overland communications east-west and north-south: the decline of the great empires in
and around Central Asia, a rise in instability in key regions along the transit routes (especially the Caucasus
and Central Asia), and the emergence of a weak and fractious China;  the rise of the Russian empire and
the expansion of Western European colonial powers in East and South East Asia creating borders across
the Eurasian continental space; the introduction of the steam ship and the opening up of the Suez Canal,
which made the sea routes more attractive and economical; and finally the rise of Communism and the
erection of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, which in effect sealed off much of the Central and Eastern parts
of the Eurasia from the rest of the continental space and from the rest of the world.
Indeed, post Second World War it was common to characterize the world as falling into three parts (see
Figure 2): the Western industrial countries; the Eastern Bloc, consisting of the Soviet Union, its satellite
states and of China; and the South, or Third World countries which gradually emerged as part of the post-
war decolonization process. Beginning with the 1950s, the West’s economies rapidly integrated broadly on
6
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1 The geographic concept of “Eurasia” is here defined to include all of the traditional geographic areas of Europe and Asia, excluding the
Arab peninsula, but including Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, with the latter two referred to as “Asia Minor” in considering regional sub-
groupings. This geographic boundary is of course arbitrary, but for economic, cultural and political reasons it is for the purposes of
this paper preferable to consider the Arab Peninsula as part of the geographic and economic region of Middle East and North Africa.
2 The empire of Genghis Khan “stretched from the snowy tundra of Siberia to the hot plains of India, from the rice paddies of Vietnam
to the wheat fields of Hungary, and from Korea to the Balkans.... [He] opened roads of commerce in a free-trade zone that stretched
across the continents... He took the disjoined and languorous trading towns along the Silk Route and organized them into history’s
largest free-trade zone.” (Weatherford, 2004, pp. xviii-xix)
3 All figures and tables referenced in the text can be found at the end of the paper.
4 Reference for Silk Road historySee for example Hopkirk, 1980.
5 A recent history of the Great Plague puts it as follows: “... the plague bacillus, Yersinia pestis, swallowed Eurasia the way a snake
swallows a rabbit – whole, virtually in a single sitting. From China in the East to Greenland in the West, from Siberia in the North to
India in the south, the plague blighted lives everywhere...” From John Kelly. The Great Mortality. An Intimate History of the Black Death,
the Most Devastating Plague of All Time. Harper Collins, 2005, quoted in The Wall Street Journal Europe, February 25-27, p. P4.market principles.  In this integration process the West also pulled along gradually, if imperfectly, the South.
In contrast, the East remained economically quite separate from the globalization process, although the
region was highly integrated internally within the Soviet Empire, and to some extent within China. And of
course, the 30 year period of 1955-85 was characterized by a high degree of geopolitical, military and
ideological competition and tension among the Western and Eastern protagonists as part of the “Cold War”.
[Figure 2]
In the 1980s a major shift in the geopolitical constellations occurred, as first China opened up politically
and economically, followed after 1985 by a loosening of political and economic controls in the Soviet Union
under its last leader, Mr. Gorbachev. This in turn led to the dramatic, albeit largely peaceful dissolution of
the Soviet Empire between 1989 and 1991, which set the stage for a transition to market economic
systems in the former Communist countries. This and the continued rapid further process of global
economic integration had two major interrelated consequences (Figure 3): 
[Figure 3]
First, the world no longer could be characterized as falling into three separate blocs; rather, it is now a
highly interdependent political system and economic, in which there are some countries and regions that
risk being marginalized (especially Africa) or subject to chronic conflicts (Middle East), but where much of
world’s  population  is  increasingly  and  intensely  linked  and  interdependent  politically  as  well  as
economically. 
Second – and this is the point of departure for our analysis in this paper –, the previously hard borders
between the Western, Eastern and Southern parts of Eurasia gradually softened as the Iron and Bamboo
Curtains  disappeared.  With  this  the  opportunities  for  economic  integration  throughout  Eurasia
dramatically increased. Of course, this process has only started. It still has to overcome many obstacles,
not least the consequences of the disintegration of the Soviet Empire which led to the creation of new
borders and the breakage of many traditional economic links across the vast space of the Former Soviet
Union. These in turn resulted in a major and protracted economic collapse in the newly created states of
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
6. 
The prospective integration of the Eurasian super-continent, as and when it happens, will have major
potential implications not only for the Eurasian region, but for the world economy. This derives from the
she size and weight of the Eurasian economic space:  In terms of demography, Eurasia in 2004 accounted
for 69% of the world’s population. Over time, this share is expected to decrease somewhat, as the overall
population of the region grows less rapidly than for the rest of the world. Nonetheless, by 2050, the region
is projected to still house almost 2/3 of the world’s population (Figure 4). 
[Figure 4] 
In terms of its economic size, Eurasia currently accounts for about 53% of World GDP in current US
dollars
7. For the future much will depend on whether the developing and transition countries of Eurasia –
East Asia, South Asia and Eastern Europe and Central Asia – will maintain their exceptionally high growth
rates of recent years on the one hand, and whether the industrialized countries of the region – Japan and
Western  Europe  –  can  recover  from  their  economic  stagnation  that  has  gripped  them  over  the  last
7
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6 Linn (2004) documents this disintegration process and its economic impact.
7 Based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.decade
8. What does appear reasonably certain is that China and India will continue to grow to become
world economic powers in their own right within the next 20-30 years. China may well surpass all its
Eurasian competitors in economic size by the year 2016 and the US sometime in the early 2040s. India is
projected to reach the former benchmark by the early 2030s (see Figure 5)
9. If Europe and Japan can turn
around their economic fortunes by good macroeconomic and structural policies and reap the potential
benefits of economic integration with their dynamic continental neighbors, then the Eurasian economy may
well approach the 60% mark or higher in terms of its share in the world economy by 2050. In one set of
heroic projections, the GPDs of China, India, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the UK combined
will exceed that of the US by 2 ½ times in 2050
10.
[Figure 5]
The remainder of this paper explores how the economic integration process in Eurasia is proceeding in
six key areas
11:
1. Energy Trade and Transport
2. Non-Energy Trade and Transport
3. Trade in Illicit Drugs
4. Investment and Capital Flows
5. Migration 
6. Communication and Knowledge
The paper also discusses briefly the institutional framework for integration in Eurasia and the possible
tensions between political and economic dimensions of the integration process. It concludes with some
preliminary observations on possible policy implications. Many of the ideas put forth below are to be taken
as hypotheses which are only partially tested by the analysis and the data presented in the paper. In this
sense, the paper summarized work in progress rather than finished research results.
One final caveat before we turn to the details of our analysis of Eurasian integration: By focusing the
spot light in this paper on Eurasia, we do not mean to belittle the importance of safeguarding and further
strengthening the links between Eurasia and its major sub-regions and the rest of the world, or that
integration in other regions of the world – Africa, the Americas, the Middle East, and Oceania – do not
face important challenges of regional and world-wide economic integration. The core point that we are
trying to establish is that integration in Eurasia, after a long delay, is catching up with the world-wide
process of integration that has taken place since the mid-1990s and will likely continue into the future with
significant opportunities and challenges for the region as well as globally.
8
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8 According to World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the developing countries of East Asia and the Pacific grew at a rate of 7.7%
in 2003, those of South Asia 7.4%, and those of Europe and Central Asia 6.0%. Japan grew at 2.1% and Western Europe at about
1%. The US grew at 2.9%, and the World economy at 2.5%.
9 Based on Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman “ Dreaming with the BRICs: The Path to 2050” Goldman Sachs, Global Economic
Paper No. 99, October 2003, p. 3.
10 Ibid., p. 19
11 There are additional areas that could be considered in terms of their relevance as region-wide integrating factors or concerns, such
as tourism development, environmental and natural resource (esp. water) management, security and crime (other than trade in illicit
drugs, including human trafficking).1. Energy Trade and Transport
Perhaps the single most important force of economic integration today in Eurasia is the linkage of major
fields of oil and natural gas reserves in Russia and around the Caspian Sea with the main consuming centers
of Western Europe and increasingly East and South Asia.  Indeed, one of the main drivers of the economic
recovery in recent years of the CIS has been the rapid growth of energy exports from that sub-region. (Hill
2004) Moreover, further substantial increases in oil production and exports are projected from Russia,
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan by 2010
12. In addition to production and exports from the CIS, there are other
important energy flows in Eurasia, including from Indonesia to East Asia and potentially from Burma to
India (see the schematic representation of key energy flows in Figure 6).
[Figure 6]
According to BP (2004), Eurasia accounted for around 36% of global oil production and just over 50%
of global natural gas production in 2003 (Tables 1 and 2). During the same year the region consumed
around 55% and 57% of the world’s oil and natural gas. For electricity there is until now only a small cross-
border market within Europe and among European countries a (Figure 7).  Most Eurasian trading blocs are
net importers of  energy  – in particular Japan and South Asia, who export virtually no energy products.
Figures 8 and 9 depict the flows of oil and gas trade, showing that Russia and Central Asia provide the lion’s
share of European oil imports, while the Middle East supplies the majority of Asia’s oil (BP 2004). For
natural  gas,  flows  are  primarily  from  the  CIS  and  northern  Europe  to  the  rest  of  Europe  and  from
Southeast Asia and the Middle East to much of the rest of Asia. Transatlantic and transpacific energy flows
are relatively minor.
[Tables 1 and 2; Figures 7-9]
Data on energy trade within Eurasia show that there has been rapid progress of integration among
Eurasian sub-regions in recent years. If one looks at energy trade 1995-2003 within Eurasian sub-regions,
one sees average annual growth of 8.5%. Over the same period, energy trade between the different blocs
grew by an annual 14.6% (Figure 10). The blocs that are the most outward focused – measured by the
relative weight of imports from outside the bloc – are China, Japan and South Asia. The former two satisfy
their energy needs by importing from Eurasian countries, while most of South Asia’s energy imports come
from outside Eurasia (Figure 11).
[Figures 10 and 11]
Bilateral  energy  trade  remains  largest,  measured  in  dollar  terms,  internally  within  Europe,  but  is
growing fastest between CIS and Europe and between Asia Minor and Japan (Figure 12). Growth is slowest
within  East  and  Southeast  Asia  and  between  it  and  its  Eurasian  trading  partners.  Overall,  while  the
landscape is an evolving one it shows considerable spatial integration and increased long-distance trade.
9
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12 Peter Thomson (2005) predicts that between 2003 and 2010 oil exports for Russia could increase by 130 million tons and from
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan by a total of  90 million tons. Of course, a lot depends on the actual implementation of development
projects throughout CIS, often financed and managed by European interests. For example, the Karachaganak oil fields in Kazakhstan
– which in early 2004 produced 210,000 bbl per day – are being developed by a consortium led by British Gas and ENI (Italy). By
2010 the Karachaganak oil fields should yield 500,000 bbl per day (EIA 2004d). [Figure 12]
To meet the burgeoning demand for energy in the region, resource rich areas – i.e., CIS and parts of
Asia Minor – have been expanding energy transport capabilities. Figures 13 and 14 illustrate the number
and direction of planned oil and gas pipelines leading to Europe. For oil projects, new pipelines will either
improve existing infrastructure and capacity for oil from Russia or will bring new sources of energy from
the Caspian Sea region via Turkey. Natural gas pipeline networks, already considerably more dense than
oil networks, will see expansion in much the same way: from Russia or from the Caspian region. 
[Figures 13 and 14]
The reorientation of Eurasia’s energy trade from a north-south (Russia-Central Asia) pipeline system
from Soviet times into an East-West network extending into Europe and East Asia is still underway. There
are a number of large pipeline construction projects, many of which involve Russian production and
exports  (see  Figure  15  from  EIA  2004e),  but  there  are  currently  also  three  large  pipeline  projects
connecting the Caspian Sea region to markets in Europe. First is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium Project
which will connect Kazakhstan’s oil fields to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The Baku-Tibilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, a 1,040 mile, $2.9 billion project will connect oil fields in Azerbaijan to the Turkish
port of Ceyhan. It is expected to become operational in 2005. (EIA 2004b) Azerbaijan currently lacks any
infrastructure to export its natural gas. The $1 billion construction of the 550-mile Baku-Tibilisi-Erzurum
or South Caucus Pipeline (SCP) will allow Azeris to export 1.5 bcf of natural gas per day (EIA 2004a)
13.
[Figure 15]
While pipeline construction feeding the European market has received the most attention, important
projects have also been considered or are being undertaken connecting Russia and Central Asia to East and
South Asia
14. For example, China and Kazakhstan signed a $700 million contract in 2004 to construct a
pipeline from Astasu to Xinjiang in Western China. Another pipeline into China, this one from Anagarsk in
Russia, is being discussed. If built it would carry as much as 1 million bbl per day (EIA 2004c). And in
December 2004, Russia is reported to have “committed to building the Taishet-Nakhodka pipeline, a
gargantuan 4,300 kilometer project that will cost $12 billion and is designed to provide 80 million tons of
oil per year to the Asian Pacific market, including 30 million tons to China.”
15 In addition, there India and
Pakistan have a strong interest in Central Asian and Iranian gas, with options being explored for natural gas
pipelines from Iran and Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India
16. Of course, as Siddiqi (2004) points out, there
are considerable political issues that could impede such pipeline projects, especially continuing insecurity
in Afghanistan. 
In addition to a growing continental energy-interdependence for oil and gas, it is likely that there will
be increasing integration of electricity grids for the continent. This will be driven in part by the efficiency
benefits from integrated electricity grids and markets, and partly by the large long-term export potential
10
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13 There is considerable economic and geopolitical interest in Europe and the US to diversify access to Caspian energy resources, as a
way to avoid dependency on Russian exports and transit routes, especially for gas. See Cohen (2005), and Thomson (2005). In
addition, the financial benefits to the transit countries can be substantial. Ukraine’s revenues from gas transit amount to about $1.5
billion a year. Georgia now receives $10 million a year, which is expected to increase to $50 million when the BTC pipeline is
completed. Georgia’s transit revenues will be further increased when the SPC gas pipeline is completed (Thomson 2005).
14 With its completion in 1997, the Korpezhe-Kurt Kui pipeline, linking Turkmenistan and Iran, was the first Central Asian pipeline to
bypass Russia. This was the first symbolic step in reorienting pipelines from a north-south into an east-west configuration (EIA 2004b).
15 Ariel Cohen, “Russian Oil after YUKOS: Implications for the United States.” Executive Memorandum No. 961, February 28, 2005, The
Heritage Foundation, Washington DC, p. 2.
16 Stephen Blank, “India’s Energy Offensive in Central Asia.” Analyst, March 9, 2005, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins
University, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3117 of Central Asia for hydropower. In particular the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan have large hydro resources
which can in principle be exploited for electricity exports to the large neighboring countries and through
“wheeling” across interconnected electricity grids even to distant markets in Europe and to Chinese and
Indian population centers
17. However, as the World Bank (2004) report on Central Asia’s electricity export
market potential makes clear (see also Figure 16), these are long-term development options, which will
require  large  public  and  private  investments,  both  in  generation  and  transmission  capacity.  Such
investments  and  their  financing  in  turn  will  depend  on  firm  take-off  agreements  and  agreements  on
integrated electricity market management, on mitigation of political and security risks along transmission
routes and on improvements in the domestic market regulation, operation and maintenance to ensure
technically secure and commercially viable electricity market links (World Bank 2004, Thomson 2005)
18.
[Figure 16]
In sum, continued development and integration of the energy sector in Eurasia is a big opportunity and
challenge. Eurasia’s continued rapid economic growth will depend to a significant extent on and effective
development and integration of the energy sector and markets. At the same time, with continued rapid
increases in energy demand in major consumption centers, large investments in energy production and
transport/transmission will be needed. Such investments will however only be made if there is a reasonably
secure political, regulatory and investment climate in the region. The mutual dependence of key players in
the energy sector will further increase over time, as will the potential for competition and even conflict
among competing energy producers (Russia, Central Asia, Iran) and among energy consumers (the EU,
China, India).  With the continuing shit of demographic and economic weights towards Asia in the coming
decades, there will be growing attention needed to how the energy needs of Asia will be met effectively
and peacefully. With Eurasia representing a large share of both energy supply and demand in the world,
how the key players, both among governments and in the private sector, respond to these opportunities
and challenges will have global economic and political implications, both in the global energy demand and
supply balance (and hence its impact on global energy prices), in its impact on global economic growth, and
in its effects on geopolitical relations among key global political players.
2. Non-Energy Trade and Transport
Traditionally, economic integration has been analyzed and measured mostly with regard to trade and
transport linkages. Turning from the most obvious of such linkages in the area of energy to other areas, the
first point to be made is that the collapse of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) had a devastating impact on
trade within the former Soviet Union and its neighbors under the Soviet regional trading block known as
COMECON.  Of course, the trade that did take place prior to 1991 in the FSU was not the result market
forces, but part of a highly specialized, regionally dispersed but also highly integrated system of production
and exchange under the Communist command economy. The collapse of much of this trade, along with
other impacts of a far-reaching process of economic disintegration in the FSU, in turn caused a severe
economic recession in the new republics of the FSU (Linn 2004). 
11
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17 World Bank, Regional Electricity Export Potential Study, Washington, DC, December 2004; also Thomson (2005).
18 Through targeted engagements (equity participation, direct investments, supply and take-off agreements) Russia’s state-owned
electricity company, RAO-UES, is positioning itself to play a major role in developing, managing and supplying the regional energy
markets in and around the CIS. (Thomson 2005, Crane 2005).However, in what can be seen as an irony of history, the collapse of the Soviet Union and of its highly
integrated internal economic structure, while causing a severe economic shock to the new republics of the
FSU, also opened the door for a far-reaching process of integration throughout the Eurasia region, by
permitting the first time in centuries the potentially free flow of goods and services across the entire
Eurasian super-continent. Not only did trade within the FSU recover, especially after the Russian financial
crisis of 1998, but trade of the new FSU republics with the rest of the world and especially their neighbors
in the Eurasian economic space recovered even more rapidly as part of a growing regional trade integration
process. Of course, major obstacles still exist to the free and efficient flow of trade in the region: trade
policies, transport infrastructure and transit conditions remain very problematic in many parts of Eurasia
and effectively raise the costs of trade and severely reduce the competitiveness especially of the large land-
locked areas of the region. This section briefly reviews the trends in regional trade of Eurasia and considers
some of the opportunities and obstacles for further trade integration.
Figure 17 depicts in a stylized fashion some of the basic presumptions about trade flows in Eurasia:
Three principal trading blocs make up the region – a European bloc, a CIS bloc and an Asian bloc. Much
of the trade that does take place would be expected to do so within the trading blocs and between them
and the rest of the world, and especially with the United States. In fact, the data confirm only part of this
story. Figure 18 shows that a much of trade in fact takes place within trading blocs, but it also shows that
trade between the combined Europe and CIS trading bloc and Asia exceeds that of each of these two blocs
with the US. In other words, Eurasia is more connected internally through trade than it is with the rest of
the world.
[Figures 17 and 18]
This picture can be refined by looking at the level, growth and composition of trade by sub-regional
trading blocs within Eurasia (Figures 19-22).  The following stylized facts emerge: 
• First, for all sub-regional blocs, except Europe, trade with partners outside the sub-region is more
important that trade within the region. For example, CIS countries exported around $23 billion worth
of  merchandise  to  other  CIS  countries,  but  exported  $83  billion  to  other  Eurasian  countries
19.
Similarly, South and Southeast Asian countries traded $136 billion worth of merchandise among each
other, but $304 billion with others. 
• Second, for all sub-regional trading blocs, intra-Eurasian trade is more important, and in most cases
much more important, than trade with the rest of the World. Even in the two most outwardly-
focused blocs, Japan and South Asia, exports to non-Eurasian countries makes up only 43% and 46%
of total exports respectively. Europe, the largest Eurasian trading bloc, sells only 20% of its total
exports outside of Eurasia.
• Third, overall export growth has been most rapid for Asia (excepting Japan), and it has been especially
rapid in terms of the growth of exports from Asia to the rest of Eurasia. By contrast, the growth of
Europe’s and Japan’s trade has been relatively slow overall and also within Eurasia. Much of the
impetus for trade integration in Eurasia clearly emanates from and is associated with the rapid growth
of much Asia (except Japan).
• Finally, despite the importance of energy flows in the region, trade is overwhelmingly concentrated in
traditional  non-energy  areas,  such  as  machinery  and  transport  equipment  (43%),  manufactured
goods (30%) and chemicals and related industrial products (13%) (Figure 22).
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19 Despite their recent recovery with regard to GDP and trade, CIS countries still under-perform in terms of export levels when
compared to other countries of similar per capita GDP (Freinkman 2004).Further trade integration in Eurasia will depend on three main factors: first, trade policy pf the countries
in  the  region;  second,  development  of  regional  transport  infrastructure;  and  third,  transit  and  trade
facilitation across and behind borders. 
[Figures 19-22]
For  trade  policy,  WTO  membership  is  a  key  element  of  global  and  regional  integration.    China’s
membership in December 2001 was a major step forward in this regard, but since most CIS countries are
not yet WTO members, their integration into the world economy and in Eurasia still lacks for now an
important impetus. It is hoped that the largest of the CIS countries, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine will
become WTO members very soon. Trade integration can also be pursued on a purely regional or bilateral
basis. Here Eurasia shows some of the most intense activity around the globe with the frequency of
regional trade agreements (RTAs) most significant in Europe and the CIS, although East Asia have engaged
in many fewer such agreements (see Figure 23 and World Trade Organization 2000).
[Figure 23]
The CIS countries, because of their central location at the heart of the Eurasia region, are particularly
important for permitting and facilitating regional trade integration Eurasia-wide. Various reviews of regional
trade policy and agreements in the CIS (Akiner, 2001; Muzafarov, 2001; Freinkman et al., 2004; World
Bank, 2005) have shown that the high frequency of bilateral, regional and global trade agreements in the
CIS, while in principle to be welcome as a recognition of the importance of regional trade integration, in
practice has not yet led to effective trade cooperation within the CIS.  The principal reasons are two-fold:
One reason is the complexity of the overlapping trade agreements (see Figure 24), which leads to what is
referred to as a “spaghetti bowl” effect of confusing and often unimplementable trade relations among
countries in the region. The second, and related, reason is that most of the agreements have actually not
been implemented or enforced in practice, either due to a lack of political readiness for cooperation and
integration, or because of the weakness of administrative capacity and high incidence of corruption in
implementing national trade policies in many of the CIS countries. 
[Figure 24]
Aside from trade policy, transport infrastructure and transit facilitation are key elements that determine
the costs of trading and access to world markets. These are particularly significant for the vast land-locked
regions of Eurasia, most notably the countries of Central Asia. The distances to the nearest ports and some
estimated costs of shipping (both in terms of money and time) are summarized in Figure 25 and Table 3.
The key question which confronts governments and private firms alike in Eurasia is whether and how the
both kinds of costs of shipping over the land routes can be significantly reduced in the foreseeable future.
One element is the improvement in the transport infrastructure (rail, roads and air). Various elements of
this are being put in place in various parts of Eurasia: From the West, the Trans-European Network (TEN)
and the Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) programs of the European Union have
made efforts to strengthen transcontinental transport routes. From the East, the Asian Development Bank
has supported regional transport infrastructure improvements in Central Asia and Western China (in
cooperation with other international financial institutions and the countries of the sub-region under the
umbrella of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Initiative – CAREC). Since 2002, with the
opening up of Afghanistan and the rehabilitation of the Afghan road net work and reconstruction of key
bridges between Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors, the north-south transport corridor in Central
Asia is being reopened. Plans are also being made for improved regional transport interconnection in
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system (See Box 1 for an example). In view of the great distances in Eurasia, the scope for the expansion
of air transport is also huge (see Figure 26 for one projection of the possible growth of EU-China flights).
At this time, some parts of Eurasia, in particular the South Caucasus and Central Asia, are very poorly
served by international and regional air service, although some investments have been made modernizing
regional airport facilities with donor assistance.
[Table 3 and Figures 25 and 26]
Perhaps  the  greatest  challenge  to  further  trade  integration  lies  in  the  need  for  improved  transit
facilitation across the many boundaries and long distances involved in the transcontinental transport routes
of Eurasia. In some ways problems have been getting worse rather than better: 
• increased visa requirements (e.g., among CIS member countries, but also in Central Europe with the
expansion of the European Union
20), 
• time consuming customs and other border inspections and expensive fees,
• informal and corrupt payments required at border and interior check points and police barricades
21,
• limited coverage and high expenses of the TIR (International Convention for Road Transport in Transit
Traffic) system,
• high Russian fees for over-flight rights for trans-Siberian international flights
22;
• lack of communication between border posts on transcontinental routes;
• lack of, or poorly developed, private trade-forwarding institutions in many of the CIS countries.
Various initiatives are underway on a sub-regional basis to improve transit facilitation in key Eurasian
corridors. For example, the Trade and Transport Facilitation in South East Europe Program (TTFSE) is
designed to reduce dramatically the time it takes to cross the many borders as trucks move from Turkey
to Western Europe while actually improving customs and security controls
23. For Central Asia the EU
Border  Management  Program  for  Central  Asia  (BOMCA)  is  designed  to  help  improve  border
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Box 1:  Kazakhstan Plans Rail Link between East Asia, Europe
From www.kazakhembus.com, March 2005
"Kazhmurat Nagmanov, Kazakhstan's Minister of Transportation, said Kazakhstan will start building a railway link in 2005 connecting
East Asia with Europe. He made the announcement on December 29. The 3,000-kilometer link is estimated to cost US$3.5 to 4 billion
and should be completed within 15 years. It will connect China via Kazakhstan with Turkmenistan and Turkey. The link is designed as
an alternative to the Trans-Siberian railway in Russia which also connects Asia with Europe and an alternative to ocean shipments. Both
Kazakhstan and Russia predict freight transit between Europe and Asia will grow and be more lucrative in the future. Once built, the
Kazakh link will have an advantage over the Russian alternative: the Kazakh railroad will be of international narrow-gauge standard,
while the Russian railway is five inches wider, designed to slow an enemy during the wars of the 20th century. This causes delays at
borders since trains need to have their wheels changed.
Minister Nagmanov said transit from East Asia to Europe via Kazakhstan would take 10 days. Cargo shipments are expected to
reach 35 million to 40 million tons a year by 2010, with potential for further growth." 
20 The EU required its new member countries, among them Poland and Hungary,. to tighten visa and other entry requirements for
border transit with their eastern neighbors (Oxford Analytica 2005). 
21 This  can  cost  around  $  1,500  per  truck  for  crossing  one  country  alone  (Kazakhstan)  (EBRD  2003).  When  moving  a  generic
consignment  from  Northern  Europe  to  Tbilisi,  Georgia  the  Georgian  leg  of  the  journey  accounts  for  almost  half  of  the  total
transportation costs. It is estimated that 90% of the costs incurred in Georgia accrue to border guards, road police and other such
agencies (World Bank 2003).
22 According to a report in the Financial Times (March 15, 2005) European carriers paid Aeroflot, the Russian state airline,   250 million
in 2003 for the rights to fly over Siberia. 
23 This program is financed by the World Bank. See the official website http://www.ttfse.org/management
24. But much needs to be done to improve transit conditions so as to facilitate an expanded
flow of trade throughout the Eurasian region.
In sum, there is already a significant amount of intra-regional trade across the Eurasian super-continent,
but further trade expansion is possible and likely, especially if it is supported by improved trade policy
(especially WTO access by the larger CIS countries), improved transport infrastructure, and enhanced
trade facilitation. More work is needed to assess the likely investment requirements, the key priorities and
sequencing  of  measures,  and  to  estimate  the  possible  gains  from  improved  integration.  In  addition,
improved cooperation among the governments of the countries in the Eurasia region and in key sub-
regions  will  be  essential  to  make  sure  major  remaining  obstacles  to  increased  trade  integration  are
removed or at least mitigated
25.
3. Trade in Illicit Drugs
One particular flow of trade is of special significance for the Eurasia region: the trade in illicit drugs
26.
Eurasia has an overwhelming share of the world’s intravenous drug users (IDUs) accounting for some 75%
of the total. Figures 27-29 show that the drug problem for Eurasia is principally one involving the use of
opiates and its production, with over 60% of illicit drug use involving opiates, and well over 90% of the
world’s  opiate  production  located  in  three  countries  of  Eurasia  –  Afghanistan,  Lao  PDR  and
Myanmar/Burma.  Afghanistan alone produces an estimated three-quarters of the world’s opium.
[Figures 27-29] 
The principal flows of drugs in Eurasia are shown schematically in Figure 30. Exact quantification is
difficult, but it is clear that the illicit drug trade moves huge quantities of opiates across Eurasia. Although
production of opium in the “Golden Triangle” of South East Asia appears to have somewhat declined in
recent years, by all accounts, production in Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004 has reached near record levels
27.
The potential farm gate value of global opium production was estimated by UNODC to amount to about
$ 1.2 billion in 2003. In recent years opiate use appears to have stabilized and may even be declining in
Western Europe, but has been increasing rapidly in Russia, which, according to UN estimates, is now the
largest heroin market in Europe. In Asia, too, a stabilizing trend in drug use can be discerned, with the
exception of China, where drug use appears to have increased at least through 2003. The estimated
number of drug users in 2003 was in excess of one million, representing a 15-fold increase since 1990. An
increasing share of the drug trafficking from Afghanistan appears to run through Central Asia. According to
one estimate there has been a 30-fold increase in heroin seizures in Central Asia since 1993
28.
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24 This program is financed by the European Union and implemented by UNDP . See the official website www.eu-bomca.org/en
25 Various studies are currently underway that will help address some of these issues. For example, the World Bank is carrying out a
major study on integration of the Europe and Central Asia Region. UNDP and ADB are collaborating on a study of regional integration
and cooperation in Central Asia which among other things aims to estimate the benefits to Central Asian countries from enhanced
trade, transport and trade facilitation. However, while extremely useful pieces of the puzzle, even these studies remain partial in their
coverage of the Eurasian integration process.
26 Unless otherwise noted the information and data provided this section are drawn from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), World Drug Report 2004, Vienna, 2004 2004 www.unodc.org
27 Paula R. Newberg, “A Drug-Free Afghanistan Not So Easy”, YaleGlobal Online, 7 March 2005,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5385
28 Kairat Osmonaliev, “Developing Counter Narcotics Policy in Central Asia: Legal and Political Dimensions.” Silk Road Paper, January
2005, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, SAIS, Washington, DC.[Figure 30]
Many efforts have been and are being made to control the production, use and trafficking of drugs in
the countries and sub-regions of Eurasia, but have generally been found to be wanting as there appears to
have been little impact on the flow of illicit drugs across the super-continent
29. Like elsewhere in the world,
as long as high demand for illicit drugs continues to persist in Western Europe, Russia and increasingly in
China, it will probably be impossible to reduce significantly the production in places like Afghanistan. Even
more so, and more certainly, it will be difficult to stop the trafficking of drugs in places like Central Asia.
Unfortunately, this trafficking in drugs has a very corrosive impact on the transit countries, as the illegal
flow of drugs undermines already weak governance structures, fosters corruption and crime, and locally
also leads to increased drug use and with it increased risks of drug-related diseases, especially of HIV/AIDS.
Since more generally, illicit drug use, production and trafficking have these deleterious impacts throughout
the region, a concerted approach to the region-wide drug problem for the Eurasian super-continent would
appear to be an increasingly pressing priority. One thing appears to be clear: as long as the principal hubs
of  drug  consumption  do  not  manage  to  control  the  effective  demand  for  drugs,  measures  to  limit
production and transcontinental trafficking will have only limited effects. 
4. Investment and Capital Flows
Cross-border investment and capital flows, particularly foreign direct investment, have also been a
recent force acting to integrate Eurasia. Until about two decades ago, there was almost no FDI or other
capital flows to speak of in the region, except in Europe, Japan and South-East Asia. China and India had
yet to start the process of liberalizing their economies and the former Soviet Union with its command
economy  and  isolationist  economic  policies  was  still  intact.  The  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the
reorientation of political alignments and trading patterns in Eurasia have been accompanied by a surge in
foreign direct investment in the region outside the traditional areas. While Europe is still the largest
recipient and source of FDI, investment growth is fastest east of Europe.
FDI and capital flows contribute to integration via two channels. First is the obvious channel: capital
flows from one country into another tie the two together economically. Secondly, by promoting growth
(and technology diffusion), capital flows likely increase trade and political cooperation – through which
integration is further enhanced. Of course, there are also significant potential downside risks from financial
and capital market linkages:
• Among them, the contagion effect of financial crisis in one country in its impact on neighboring
countries is perhaps the most obvious. It was painfully experienced during the 1997/8 financial crisis,
when the financial collapse which started in East and South East Asia transmitted itself world-wide,
but  also  within  Eurasia.  For  example,  the  withdrawal  of  Korean  investors  from  the  Russian
government bond market in the wake of the Korean financial crises was one factor explaining the
timing of the Russian financial crisis in 1998. The Russian crises in turn affected Russia’s neighbors
through various transmission mechanisms, including reduced capital outflows and investments.   
• Another downside of capital mobility set in when capital flight prevails, as it has for many years in the
case of Russia. Some $20 billion of flight capital a year are thought to have left Russia during much of
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29 See for example Niklas Swanstrom, “Multilateralism and Narcotics Control in Central Asia.” CEF Quarterly, February 2005, pp. 5-15;
Svante E. Cornell, “Stemming the Contagion: Regional Efforts to Curb Afghan Heroin’s Impact”, Georgetown Journal of International
Affairs, Winter/Spring 2005, pp. 23-31.the 1990s. While much of this was globally invested, much of it likely found its first “resting place” in
Western Europe (especially Cyprus and Switzerland). 
• Finally, there is the monetary dimension of international financial linkages: Asian economies have been
the greatest holders of international foreign reserves, mostly kept in US dollars. However, with the
introduction of the Euro and the recent pressures on the value of the dollar, there is increasing
speculation that Asian central banks may wish to diversify their reserves by increasing their Euro
holdings relative to the dollar. This special dimension of increasing Eurasian integration could have
very important and potentially disastrous implications for the world economy.
In the rest of this section we shall focus mostly on foreign direct investment (FDI) as an important
source of economic linkage and integration. Unfortunately the data on FDI are weak, especially since they
do not readily permit an assessment of regional and sub-regional FDI numbers and trends disaggregated
by destination and source. Nonetheless, we have taken a first stab at the available numbers to see whether
the stylized FDI flows shown in Figure 31 are broadly accurate.
[Figure 31]
Eurasia as a whole is a net foreign direct investor, albeit only slightly so. It is the repository of over 60
percent of the world’s FDI stock (Figure 32). Within Eurasia, Europe is both the biggest investor and
recipient of investment. Europe, China and East and Southeast Asia together account for almost the entire
inward stock of FDI. In outward stock, the story is much the same, except that Japan’s role is significant.
Investment volumes in CIS, Asia Minor and South Asia are negligible by comparison, but interestingly these
three regions are also the ones that have seen the greatest FDI growth from 1995 to 2003. For example,
while FDI growth in Europe has averaged around 15% annually (for both inward and outward investments
from 1995-2003), annual inward and outward FDI growth has been 31% and 43%, respectively, for the
CIS. For South Asia, FDI growth rates have been 17% and 30% (Figure 33). In part this reflects growth
from a low base.
[Figure 32 and 33]
Six broad hypotheses or presumptions regarding the composition and direction of FDI trends for
Eurasia  can  be  posited,  even  though  the  evidence  available  to  us  does  not  yet  permit  a  firm  set  of
conclusions:
1. Traditionally, FDI flows from the EU and Japan to the rest of Eurasia are likely to have been the most
significant, albeit relatively small compared to the two-way FDI flows from and to the rest of the
world (especially the US). Nonetheless, there are likely to have emerged some new trends recently,
which point to increased regional integration and diversification of capital flows within Eurasia.
2. Over the last 20 years there has been a rapid increase of European investment in China.
3. Especially after 1998, there has been increased direct investment from Europe to Russia.
4. Recently, there have been increased investment flows from Russia to Central and Western Europe
and to the rest of the CIS (Table 4)
30.
5. There has been increased FDI from Turkey in the CIS, especially in Russia and in Central Asia.
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30 Crane (2005) has looked at Russian investments in the CIS and found that Russian firms are indeed increasingly investing in neighboring
CIS countries. Russia has a considerable share of FDI inflows in Belarus, Moldova, Armenia and Ukraine (Figure 33). Russian firms
seem to be more adept than investors form Western industrialized countries in dealing with the poor business climate widely
prevailing in the CIS countries. Crane also concludes that with the exception of the energy sector, the Russian government has not
been directly involved in guiding foreign investments. 6. China and India have started investing in the CIS, especially in the energy sector, as part of their
strategy to increase their access to Russian oil
31.
[Table 4]
This increased FDI engagement across borders in Eurasia is to be welcomed for a number of reasons:
First, all available evidence, including research in the region itself, confirms that foreign direct investment
on balance helps improve productivity and growth. For example, Carstensen (2004) has used panel level
data to examine the welfare effects of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, and finds the link between FDI
and growth to be significant. And Campos (2002) examined the impact of FDI on GDP growth based on
panel data on 25 countries in East and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union between 1990 and
1998. He finds that FDI has a positive and significant causal impact on GDP growth
32. This finding implies
that FDI – via channels that result from economic growth – has the externality of encouraging further
integration,  not  only  between  the  two  countries  which  were  involved  in  a  particular  investment
transaction, but region-wide
Of course, a major prerequisite for higher FDI, from other parts in Eurasia and from the rest of the
world, in the lagging sub-regions (CIS, Indian subcontinent, Asia Minor) is that the local business and
investment  climate  be  supportive  for  investment  and  enterprise  development  more  generally.  Much
remains to be done in this regard not only at the national level in these sub-regions, but also at the
provincial and municipal level, since much research on success and failure to attract foreign investment has
shown the importance of local business conditions
33.
In conclusion, the recent strengthening of cross-border investments in Eurasia as part of the growing
economic integration of the super-continent is to be welcomed. Taking a leaf from the experience of
economic integration in the EU, as well as across the Atlantic between the US and Europe and across the
Pacific between the US and East Asia, in the longer term it is the integration of firms through investments
across borders which brings the greatest boost to trade and growth, as well as the greatest guarantee of
stable long-term political relations
34.
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31 Some observers are talking about the revival of the idea of a “Strategic Triangle” (attributed originally to former Russian Prime Minister
Primakov) between China, India and Russia in the political, energy and commercial fields (see , ''Setting the Stage for a New Cold War:
China's Quest for Energy Security'', Power and Interest News Report, PINR, 25 February 2005,
http://pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=272&language_id=1 It is surmised that Chinese state banks helped finance
with a $6 billion loan facility the purchase (initially by a dummy company, eventually by the Russian state oil company, Rosneft) of
Yuganskneftegaz, the subsidiary of YUKOS in December 2004 banks (Cohen, 2005) For India, the national oil and gas company ONGC
is reported to have supported the same sale with a dummy bid (Blank 2005). From the same report the following quote attests to
the growing engagement of  Indian interests in the CIS energy sector: “At the December 3-4, 2004 summit with Russia, India
announced a $ 3 billion Indian investment in the Sakhalin-3 oil field and in the joint Russian-Kazakh Kurmangazy oil field in the Caspian.
India’s Energy Minister, Mani Shankar Aiyer has stated that ‘what I am talking about is the strategic alliance with Russia in energy
security, which is becoming for India at least as important as our national security.” (Blank, 2005) See also Pramit Mitra, “Indian
Diplomacy Energized by Search for Oil”, YaleGlobal, 14 March 2005, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5419
32 Campos uses instrumental variables to control for reverse causality.
33 See EBRD 2003 for the transition economies. For Vietnam, Meyer (2005) analyzes the importance of local institutions and policies
– including local education rates, industrial real estate availability, and passenger transport volumes – in attracting foreign direct
investors. He finds that such sub-national institutional factors have a significant impact on FDI entry location and mode. Elsewhere
in China, case studies have pointed out the importance of an active city government in reaching out to and luring foreign investors
(Wang 2004). 
34 For a discussion of the role of economic links as a glue for stable long-term transatlantic relations, see Johannes F. Linn, “The Economic
Ties that Bind” Current History, November 2004, pp. 370-3755. Migration
35
Population movements have been another important integrating factor in world history, including in
Eurasia. Historically large transcontinental migration flows of people took place in prehistoric and ancient
times – mostly from East to West. Then there was – in the opposite direction – significant voluntary and
forced migration of Russians
36 in Tsarist Russia, and subsequently the mostly forced movement of large
numbers of people in the Soviet Union. More recently, there has been significant migration in Europe as a
result of war and post World War II, in response to economic opportunities. However, these recent
migration flows within Eurasia do not compare in relative size or significance with the centuries-long
history of transatlantic migration from Europe to the United States
37. As with trade and capital flows, the
Iron and Bamboo Curtains – and especially the restrictive immigration policies in Europe – acted as
effective barriers to large movements of people on a transcontinental scale. 
After the demise of the Soviet Union, there were initially some sizeable movements of people mostly
of Russian origin from the new CIS republics back to Russia. Hill and Gaddy (2003) cite estimates of around
3 million people
38. And in countries with war and civil disturbances, refugees and internally displaced
people  relocated  often  within  their  own  countries  (Azerbaijan,  Georgia,  Tajikistan).  Since  the  early
transition years, however, most of the migration movements are for economic reasons. They fall into
several streams, as schematically shown in Figure 34:
39
• Migration within the recently enlarged European Union and its immediate neighbors (esp. Turkey,
South East Europe and Ukraine, Moldova, etc.).
• Migration from South Asia to Western Europe, often in stages, via the CIS; in frequent cases, such
migrants stay considerable periods in transit or settle along the way in the CIS countries, due to
difficulties entering Central and Western Europe.
• Migration from Central Asia to Russia (and increasingly within Central Asia to Kazakhstan).
• Migration within Russia from the cold northern and north-eastern regions to Central and South-
Central Russia
• Migration within China and from China to Far-Eastern Russia.
[Figure 34]
Unfortunately, comprehensive and accurate data on Eurasian migration flows are scant. It is hoped that
ongoing research will help fill some of the gaps. From the information that is available
40, it appears that
none of these migration flows are currently very large in absolute or relative terms when measured by
historical standards of major migration movements. However, there are exceptions for certain countries
and locations both in terms of the countries of origin (for example, the cumulative migration to Russia from
19
Studies & Analyses No. 298 – Economic Integration of Eurasia: Opportunities and Challenges of Global Significance 
35 Much of the information summarized in this section is gleaned from Hill (2004) and Hill and Gaddy (2003).  A major study on migration
in Europe and Central Asia is under preparation at the World Bank and, once completed, should throw considerably more light on
the issues tentatively explored in this section. 41 Irinnews, “Central Asia:  Special Report on Labor Migrants in Russia,” 13 July 2004.
36 Some non-Russians from the West, such as German settlers, were invited to various parts of the Tsarist Russia and then further
resettled, mostly in Central Asia, under Stalin (Janssen 1997). There was also settlement of significant numbers of non-Russian settlers
from the East, especially Koreans in Central Asia (Diener 2004 ).
37 There were also significant transpacific migration flows from Asia to the US (Min 2002).
38 A substantial number of people with Kazakh origin also resettled from China into Kazakhstan. [referenceSource to be added]
39 There are of course other migration flows not shown in Figure 33, particularly from Africa to Western Europe.
40 E.g., United Nations, International Migration 2002, UN Population Division, October 2002; OECD, “Trends in International Migration”,
2002, www.oecd.org/dataoecdthe Kyrgyz Republic and from Tajikistan has been estimated to represent almost 10% for Kyrgyztan and up
to 18% for Tajikistan)
41 and in terms of certain locations of the receiving countries (certain parts of
Moscow, for example, are heavily populated with Central Asian migrants, just as certain parts of Berlin
house large concentrations of Turkish immigrants). 
Looking ahead, one can project that there will be increasing pressures for larger transcontinental
migration flows in Eurasia for two main economic reasons: 
• Population pressures, especially in South Asia and to some extent in East Asia, will remain relatively
high, while in Europe, the CIS and Japan populations will stagnate or even decline (see Figure 4). The
latter set of countries with aging populations will to some extent have to draw on the labor supply of
younger populations of the former countries if they want to avoid serious imbalances between their
working age and old-age populations. 
• At the same time, income and wage differentials will remain very significant between the industrialized
sub-regions and the developing sub-regions, even as with more rapid economic growth in the latter,
these differentials will become somewhat less severe over time. 
At the same time, restrictive labor market conditions and migration policies, grounded in the economic,
cultural and political realities of the potential receiving countries, will act as serious barriers to labor
mobility across borders in Eurasia. This in turn may lead to countervailing capital flows and relocation of
jobs, including through progressive outsourcing, to the cheaper labor areas of Eurasia. Some fears of this
are already prevalent today. For example, in the new EU member countries, such as Hungary, there are
considerable fears that multinationals, who had originally located their production facilities in Central
Europe due to relative labor cost advantage, will now move their plants progressively to Asia, especially
India and China. The current tensions in Europe around this dilemma – admitting more migrants or losing
more jobs – is already a political reality today. All indications are that it will become more pronounced, as
the distances across the Eurasian super-continent effectively become shorter and shorter. 
6. Communication and Knowledge Sharing
One of the key factors in shrinking distances has been the development of modern communication and
information technology. The most important element has been undoubtedly the development of the
internet and internet connectivity. Eurasia is no exception in this regard. Figure 35 shows the degree of
internet penetration and growth in access for different sub-regions in Eurasia. Not surprisingly, Europe and
Japan have the highest penetration rates, but the highest growth rates are in the other sub-regions, albeit
from relatively low levels. Continued rapid growth in connectivity can be expected, as there have been
significant improvements in the super-continents coverage by communications satellite footprints. Special
programs have been put in place to support connectivity in particularly poorly served sub-regions, and
institutions and programs have developed to provide access to world-wide knowledge, communication
and learning. For example:
• The “Virtual Silk Highway Project”, which has been organized, with the support of the NATO Science
Division and other donors and institutions, provides internet access to the South Caucasus and
Central Asian CIS countries
42. By making available satellite access (see Figure 36) and providing
support for the development of country-based networks of internet providers the project is designed
to increase information access in these land-locked countries. 
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41 Irinnews, "Central Asia: Special Report on Labor Migrants in Russia," 13 July 2004.
42 See the website http://www.silkproject.org/• The World-Bank sponsored Global Development Learning Network (GDLN) has established learning
centers in most of the countries of the Eurasia Region (and in the rest of the world), with video and
internet  access  around  the  globe  that  permits  and  supports  distance  learning  and  conferencing
activities on a significant scale
43. They can serve for global, regional and sub-regional communication
and learning activities. 
• The “Global Development Network” serves as a global umbrella organization for regional networks
of development research institutions around the globe, among them networks in Europe, the CIS, and
East and South Asia
44.
• The “Development Gateway” and its country and regional internet portals assure instant access to
country-specific,  regional  and  global  knowledge  and  communication
45.  For  Eurasia  of  particular
interest  is  the  “Central  Asian  Gateway”  which  serves  as  a  portal  for  sub-regional  information
exchange and cooperation
46.
[Figures 35 and 36]
These are just some of the many examples of how modern IT technology affords instant access to
information around the globe and around the huge Central Asia super-continent. Of course, IT technology
permits improved communication in many other ways that will help integrate Eurasia. For example, it permits
more efficient customs clearance for transit traffic by electronic information sharing among border posts
within and across countries (as for example in the previously cited project for trade and transit facilitation in
South East Europe). Private enterprises, among them banks, transport companies and others engaged in
transnational  business,  will  of  course  make  use  of  modern  IT  facilities  in  an  ever  expanding  way.  As
connectivity increases throughout the Eurasian region, huge geographic distances will matter less and less.
7. The Institutional Infrastructure and Politics of Regional Cooperation
and the Future of Regional Integration in Eurasia
The preceding sections have documented intensifying trends towards integration of economic activity
and communication across Eurasia. Despite these trends, there is currently no overarching institutional
framework for regional cooperation, nor should it be expected that there will be one soon. However,
overlapping initiatives for sub-regional cooperation and integration are expanding throughout the region.
These are both a result of the increased economic integration and a factor driving closer integration. 
Here are some prominent examples of regional cooperative institutions, none of which however is all-
encompassing for Eurasia as a whole:
• ASEM (the Asia-Europe Meeting) is the largest group with 39 members, encompassing the (now-
enlarged) EU members, all ASEAN countries and China, Japan and South Korea; CIS and South Asia
are not members (see Figure 36); 
• The European Union (EU) with 25 members is the most integrated sub-regional grouping, and with
its  planned  further  accessions  in  South  East  Europe  will  further  increase  its  reach.  The  EU’s
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43 See the website http://www.gdln.org/index.html
44 See the website http://www.gdnet.org/about_gdn/
45 See the website http://home.developmentgateway.org/
46 See the website http://www.cagateway.org/“Neighborhood Policy” extends to six CIS countries as well as a number of North-African and Middle
Eastern countries.
• The CIS is a loose assembly of 13 republics of the Former Soviet Union. 
• Various smaller sub-regional groupings involve various members of the CIS and some of their Eurasian
neighbors; among them perhaps most notable are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
with China, Russia and four Central Asian members (Turkmenistan is not a member), the Central Asia
Cooperation Organization (CACO) with the same membership as SCO minus China;  the Economic
Cooperation Organization (ECO), which includes the five Central Asian countries plus Afghanistan,
Azerbaijan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.
• Various East and South East Asian groupings, especially ASEAN and SAARC (see Figure 37).
• In addition, there are various regional groupings supported by or involving multilateral institutions,
such as the UN regional economic commissions for Europe (ECE) and Asia (ESCAP), the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).  They,
as well as the World Bank, have in recent years become increasingly active in supporting sub-regional
cooperation and integration initiatives. The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and the Central Asia
Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) initiatives are prime examples of sub-regional cooperation
efforts supported by multilateral institutions, such as the ADB.  Indeed, most aid donors active in the
developing countries of Eurasia have now designed sub-regional approaches and strategies in key sub-
regions (especially for Central Asia).
[Figure 37]
Many of these sub-regional institutional frameworks do not appear to be operationally focused, in terms
of supporting, funding and implementing specific programs and projects designed to support the effective
integration of the sub-regions or to address key issues of Eurasia-wide concern (such as integration of the
transport, transit, and energy infrastructure and regulatory frameworks). However, these interlocking
forums do provide for regular contact and exchange at heads-of-state and at ministerial levels. This itself
helps to build trust, smoothes key bilateral relations, and over the long term probably supports selected
initiatives that help with sub-regional and even Eurasia-wide integration. 
This political and policy dialogue at the highest governmental level among the countries of Eurasia is
important not least because it may help answer a key question about the future of cooperation and
integration  in  Eurasia:  Will  the  unquestionable  gains  from  economic  integration  and  the  increased
interdependency, as well as a shared need for economic stability and prosperity among Eurasian countries
drive increased political cooperation and peaceful coexistence in the region? Or will long-standing political
tensions and new competition for scarce resources, especially for energy, create regional instability and
divisions and, with this, serious barriers to the quick economic integration of Eurasia?
There certainly are plenty of potential sources of conflict within the region:  he long-standing conflict
between India and Pakistan; the North-East Asian tensions around North Korea, competition between
China and Japan, and the simmering tension between China and its Province of Taiwan; resurgence of
conflicts in the South Caucasus and new conflicts in Central Asia; competition between China and Russia;
difficulties with further EU enlargement, especially around Turkey’s accession, and problems with the EU’s
strict control over its borders. Add to this the unstable situation in Afghanistan, the persistent tensions over
Iran and the deep-seated and violent conflicts of the rest of the Middle East, which can spill over in many
different ways into the Eurasian political scene. All these might destabilize important parts of Eurasia with
spill-over effects for the rest of the region and even globally.
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The EU has become more actively engaged in its dialogue with key regional players, including China,
Russia, Iran, and in the context of key sub-regional initiatives (ASEM, EU Neighborhood, the TACIS Central
Asia regional strategy, etc.). Both China and Russia have shown increased interest in and engagement of
Central  Asia,  both  with  the  apparently  consistent  goal  of  supporting  the  emergence  of  a  stable  and
prosperous sub-region there. China and Russia, as well as other regional players, have been supportive of
the post-9/11 engagement of the US and of NATO in Afghanistan with the goal of a peaceful, democratic
and prosperous nation. India and Pakistan not only show signs of wanting to settle their long standing
Kashmir conflict, but also are increasingly looking to cooperate over access to the energy sources of Iran,
Central Asia and Russia. ASEAN and China in November 2004 agreed to closer cooperation in moving
towards  the  creation  of  a  free  trade  zone  between  them
47.  These  tendencies  towards  peaceful
cooperation seem to bode well for a stable long-term future for Eurasia and for continued economic
integration.
8. Conclusions and Policy Implications
While the evidence on Eurasian economic integration that we have been able to assemble so far
remains partial and fragmentary, we come to the conclusion nonetheless that over the last 20 years there
has been a remarkable process of establishing ever closer and more complex economic links throughout
this enormous region. No doubt these trans-Eurasian links are not nearly as tight as they are across the
Atlantic or the Pacific. But the trends are unmistakable: for better or worse – and mostly for the better we
believe – economic integration in Eurasia will continue at a fast pace with the potential of catching up in
terms of intensity with the economic integration that characterized transatlantic, transpacific and trans-
American economic relations. While competition for energy resources and long-standing political tensions
may complicate and in some areas slow down this process, we are hopeful that Eurasia will see peaceful
and cooperative solutions for these tensions.  Ultimately there is so much to gain for all concerned, both
within the region and globally. Indeed, we believe the close association of economic integration and
political cooperation across the Atlantic and the Pacific over the last 50 years, against the backdrop of many
violent conflicts of the past and despite the occasional competition and tension among the partners, are
pointing towards a similar outcome in Eurasia[DT1][RTF annotation: This sentence is a bit unclear to me.]
as a distinct and hopeful possibility.
What can be done in the policy arena to help bring about this favorable scenario?  
•  Major  investments  in  transcontinental  and  sub-regional  infrastructure  are  required  to  support
increased regional trade and communication.
• These investments need to be accompanied by improvements in and harmonization of the policy and
regulatory regimes across countries for transit of goods, services and people. Also important are
“behind-the-border” reforms, especially improvements in the investment climate, more effective
public administration and reduction in corruption.
• Early universal membership in the WTO is preferable to reinforcing the “spaghetti bowl” of (sub-)
regional trade agreements.
• Major investments in energy production and transport are needed, but should be matched by cross-
23
Studies & Analyses No. 298 – Economic Integration of Eurasia: Opportunities and Challenges of Global Significance 
47 As reported in China Daily, 30 November 2004.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-11/30/content_395778.htmborder agreements on regulation and by measures to improve efficiency of energy use so as to reduce
pressures on energy prices and on the environment.  Also, region-wide agreements are necessary to
address competing claims for access to regional energy resources by key players (EU, China, India,
Japan, US).
• There is a need for a serious review of current illicit drug control policies region-wide with a view
towards combating or at least better managing the use, production and trafficking of illicit drugs.
• A better understanding and a clear vision are needed for the role of migration in Eurasia as a means
to support the long-term stable and prosperous development of the various sub-regions, those with
demographic deficits as well as those with population surpluses.
• Private and public networks of knowledge, business and civil society groups should increasingly take
a transcontinental view for Eurasia as a whole, rather than clinging to purely country or sub-regional
perspectives. Of course this should not be to the exclusion of linking with global as well as trans-
oceanic networks. 
The key actors in bringing about these needed policy actions are in the first instance the governments
of the largest countries in the region. For the immediate future, it is likely that the EU will have to play a
lead role in opening up a Eurasia-wide perspective of cooperation and integration. However, for the
longer-term, there is no question that the quartet of China, EU, India and Russia represents the key players
that need to cooperate together constructively and deliberately in supporting the effective integration of
Eurasia. Together they will have to pay particular attention to ensure that the fragile border regions of the
South Caucasus and of Central Asia become stable and prosperous parts of an integrated Eurasia; and that
the shared problems of an unstable and conflict-ridden Middle East neighborhood and of a poor and
fractious Africa to the South are effectively addressed by the world community. 
If the key players in Eurasia each take on constructive roles in shaping a common trans-continentally
integrated economy, then the US can restrict itself to play a relatively minor, supportive role. Should intra-
Eurasian political frictions prevail, then of course a more active role by the US might be needed to help
settle such conflicts in a peaceful and least disruptive manner.  More generally, for the US it would seem
desirable in view of the inevitable growth of China and India as strong economic and political players, and
in view of the emergence of a new super-continental economic bloc, to do the following: help develop
global economic and political steering mechanisms such as the G-20, elevated appropriately to summit
level; and help bind together into a cooperative institutional structure all major players in the emerging,
highly integrated but multi-polar world community.
Finally,  key  multilateral  institutions,  such  as  the  UN  agencies,  the  World  Bank  and  the  regional
development banks will need to play a much more active role in helping the regional integration of Eurasia,
both at the sub-regional and at the overarching regional level. This will require more cooperation among
these agencies; but also within the agencies it will require a clearer vision and programs that cut across the
frequently constraining internal bureaucratic boundaries of regional and sub-regional organizational units.
There are encouraging signs that this is beginning to happen, but more concerted and effective steps of
inter-agency and internal cooperation are needed.
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Figure 1. The Ancient Silk Road
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Figure 3. The World of Today and Tomorrow (1990-2020)
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Figure 13. Pan-European Crude Oil Pipelines
Figure 14. Pan-European Natural Gas Pipelines33
Studies & Analyses No. 298 – Economic Integration of Eurasia: Opportunities and Challenges of Global Significance 
Figure 15. Major Russian Oil and Gas Pipelines and Projects
Source: U.S. Government Energy Information Administration
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Figure 17. Non-Energy Trade and Transport





Figure 18. Non-Energy Trade and Transport35








Asia Minor China CIS   East &
Southeast
    Asia
Europe Japan South Asia
Inter-Bloc ROW Within Bloc
Eurasian Export Split by Trading Bloc, 2003
Source: WDI, BoP Data.



































































































































































































20%4 0 %6 0 %8 0 % 1 0 0 %































































































$54B $456B $112B $440B $2,514B $269B $48B
CIS
Eas t & 





t  t 
4th Quartile >16%
3rd Quar tile 10-16%
2nd Quartile 6-9%
1st Quar tile <5%
t  t 
4th Quartile >16%
3rd Quar tile 10-16%
2nd Quartile 6-9% 2nd Quartile 6-9%
1st Quar tile <5% 1st Quar tile <5%
Source: UN COMTRADE database.36








Asia Minor China CIS  East & 
Southeast
    Asia
Europe Japan ROW South Asia
Goods Services
Growth in exports of Goods and Services
             (By Region, 1992-2002)
Note: CIS growth figures 1994-2002.
Source: WDI, BoP Data.
Figure 22. 
 
      Miscellaneous
manufactured articles
            14%
      Mineral fuels,
lubricants and related
              7%
  Manufactured goods
(classified by materials)
             16%     Machinery and
transport equipment
            43%
Animal and vegetable
  oils, fats and waxes
               0%
 Beverages
and tabacco
       1% Chemicals and related
           products
              13% Commodities
 and all other
        3%
  Crude materials
(inedible, not fuels)
             3%
Composition of Eurasian Trade in 2003
Source: UN COMTRADE database.37
Studies & Analyses No. 298 – Economic Integration of Eurasia: Opportunities and Challenges of Global Significance 
Figure 23. Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) Globally
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Figure 24.“RTA Spaghetti Bowel“ in Central and South Eastern Europe And The FSU
Source: World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2005.38
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Figure 25. Transit Links of Central Asian Republics with World Markets
Source: UNESCAP , 2003.
Figure 26. Projected Increase in EU-China Flights 2003-2023
Source: http://www.boeing.com/randy/2005/february.html39
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Figure 26. Projected Increase in EU-China Flights 2003-2023
Source: http://www.boeing.com/randy/2005/february.html
Figure 27. Global Opium Production, 1990-2003 (metric tons)
Figure 28. Main Problem Drugs (as reflected in treatment demand), 1998-200240
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Figure 29. Estimates of the Size of the IDU Population (1998-2003)
Figure 30. Drug Flows in Central Asia
Eurasia
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Figure 31. Eurasian Capital Flows
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Figure 37. ASEM and Other Regional Groupings
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/asem_process/asem_chart.htm44
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Table 1. Global Oil Production
Source: BP 2004 Statistical Review of World Energy45
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Table 2. Global Natural Gass Production
Source: BP 2004 Statistical Review of World Energy46
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Road 4,391 3,350 10 0.76
Northern Moscow
Rail 4,050 1,100 17 0.27
Road 4,090 5,300 13 1.30
Western Baku
Rail 3,934 1,800 18 0.46
Road 3,120 4,650 16 1.49
Southern Tehran
Rail 3,250 1,200 16 0.37
Road 1,330 2,150 5 1.90
Eastern Urumqi
Rail 1,338 1,016 8 0.76
Source: NEA (2002) and World Bank Staff
Table 4. FDI in the CIS in 2003 ($millions)




Russian as % of Total
Armenia 139.6 793 17.6
Azerbaijan 509.5 8,639 5.9
Belarus 709.7 1,897 37.4
Georgia 103.8 1,336 7.8
Kazakhstan 7.0 17,567 0.0
Kyrgyzstan 0.1 491 0.0
Moldova 169.8 789 21.5
Tajikistan 0.4 36 1.1
Turkmenistan 0.0 NA NA
Ukraine 1,262.2 7,502 16.8
Uzbekistan 2.0 NA NA
Total 2,904.0 39,051 7.4
Source: Crane (2005), International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, October 2004.